Depleted Reserves in Times of Conflict

by Jay Vannini

Bladed stibnite (antimony). Stibnite contains ~72% antimony, with much of the balance composed of sulfur. Chashan Antimony-Tungsten Mine, Guangxi Province, PR China. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

Author’s note: This article was published a few days before the opening salvos in the current global trade war were fired in early April. Since then, everyone who posts online seems to have received a “Wiki” course in critical minerals and their importance to modern economies. It is worth emphasizing that there were plenty of voices calling for safeguarding sources and rebuilding inventories of these for years prior to the events of 2024 and 2025, but these recommendations fell largely on deaf ears.

If your brain aches from hearing politicos and media bobble-heads squawking the term “rare earths” of late, you are not alone. Among the hot national security topics being blathered about in supposedly informed global discourse these days, rare earth elements and other strategic/critical mineral resources have recently landed center stage with a loud and confusing thud.

Understandably, the general public is largely uninformed about the economic importance of these commodities, and the available evidence suggests that the political class is unforgivably, breathtakingly clueless about them.

But the real story is not that policymakers are mostly ignorant of the vulnerabilities to these critical mineral supply chains, but rather that almost nothing was apparently done to mitigate these risks until the import of some of them were abruptly sanctioned by the U.S. and EU, or exports shut down by producing countries over the past three years.

Cue demonization of them damned tricky foreigners as being the culprits behind this former complacency on our end.

The U.S. Geological Survey (2025a) noted that: “In December 2023 China implemented export bans and export restrictions on certain strategic materials and commodities…China was the dominant global producer of many critical mineral materials, and many of the materials were on the United States critical minerals list.”

So, gratuitously antagonizing China when you rely almost entirely on some of their resources perhaps is unwise?

Once again, we can thank the (supposedly) smartest people in the room who clearly have failed spectacularly upwards for leaving us ass over teakettle and in open conflict with near monopolistic national suppliers of many critical mineral resources.

Just how far behind the eight ball are we? President Donald Trump’s recent emergency decree provides more than a hint.

The Presidential Executive Order of March 20, 2025 under section 303 of the Defense Production Act, “The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, the Chair of the NEDC, and the heads of other agencies as the Secretary of Defense deems necessary or appropriate to advance domestic mineral production in the United States…the Secretary of Defense shall add mineral production as a priority industrial capability development area for the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment Program. “

Blue fluorite (fluorspar). Blanchard Mine, Socorro County, New Mexico, USA. There are many well-known localities for fluorspar in the U.S. but this mineral is not currently being mined domestically for industrial use. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

Depending upon the definition and application selected, strategically important minerals can include a fairly wide range of commodities. In the U.S., the Energy Act of 2020–with undeniable logic–defines a critical mineral as, “Any mineral, element, substance, or material designated as critical by the Secretary of Interior…”, which currently includes a list of critical minerals published recently by the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 2018; revised in 2022 in 87 FR 10381). THE USGS list includes 50 minerals, some of which will be familiar to the reader: e.g., aluminum (Al), chromium (Cr), lithium (Li), magnesium (Mg), nickel (Ni), platinum (Pt), and tin (Sn); others less so, e.g. antimony (Sb), cobalt (Co), manganese (Mn), palladium (Pd), tungsten (W), and titanium (T]). The majority fall into the exotic and rare earth elements category, including cerium (Ce), iridium (Ir), fluorite/fluorspar (CaF2), lanthanum (La), tantalum (Ta), yttrium (Y), and zirconium (Zr).

Bladed golden barite (barite) on indeterminate matrix. Barite has many industrial applications, including in the manufacture of shielding agents for different types of radiation, including X-rays and at nuclear reactors. Cerro Warihuyn, Huánuco Region, Perú. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

From a practical standpoint for the U.S, critical and strategic minerals are those required by civilian and military industries that are available domestically in insufficient quantities, or are impractical to extract and process, in order to meet normal demand by manufacturers during trade conflicts or wartime collapse of supplies.

Like many other rockhounds, my interest in collector mineral species has led to an awareness of sources and relative scarcity of these crystals, their associated metals and metalloids, and their importance to metallurgy. As someone involved in environmental issues, I have long followed the debate over commercial mines and mining activity in the Developing World or Global South. And as a retired securities analyst and trader, I still keep a weather eye on consumption patterns and supply risks for strategic resources that translate into tradable market moves. In the specific case of critical minerals, what I have belatedly realized is that due to systematic planning failures by policy makers and governments in the Global North/G7 political block, they have exposed their high tech and defense production capabilities to severe shortages and other logistics issues by failing to plan for the aftermath of picking fights with exporting countries, especially those adversaries having peer or near peer militaries.

We are currently being subjected to daily strafings of the MUH RARE EARTHS = MUCHO DINERO BRO’-type, together with linkage between recent significant disruptions in supply chains to ever more transparent U.S., UK, and EU designs on African, Eastern European, and Greenlandic critical mineral resources.

Mixed botryoidal and crystalline erythrite (cobalt). While dwarfed by Congolese output, Morocco is a significant and politically stable exporter of cobalt. Bou Azzer Mine, Ouarzazate Province, Morocco. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

This narrative obscures failures in securing adequate stockpiles and safeguarding supply chains for many strategic mineral resources.

There is a considerable body of older published evidence that shows many analysts in both public and private sectors have been consistent and prescient in their calls for the urgent need to rapidly rebuild G7 strategic mineral stockpiles given the fact that many primary sources were located in countries this political block now openly considers to be its enemies. Those familiar with the way many governments work will not be surprised to learn that these recommendations were largely ignored by the same cadre of politicians who are now running around like headless chickens and crafting “Oh-shit-too-late!” legislative remedies and seeking emergency trade pacts designed to look like they’re serious about building inventories of many of the feed-stock minerals required by military industrial complexes to manufacture modern communication gear and weapons.

For one example of planning failure due to unwarranted smugness, U.S. emergency stockpiles of these elements as of March 2023 were equivalent to a scant 1.2% (!!) of the monetary value of the 1962 Cold War-era inventory (Wischer, 2024). It goes without saying that the composition of specific materials in critical mineral stockpiles is unevenly distributed, and it is more than likely that the onset of a sharp, sudden armed conflict–increasingly a likely event of late–would find many (all?) G7 countries unable to source adequate volumes of key commodities required by their militaries and civilian industries.

The likely remedy?

Regime change and smash and grab of natural resources by the U.S. and its vassals coming soon to a poorly-armed, mineral-rich nation in the Global South.

Zoned pink fluorite (fluorspar) on bladed barite (barite). Spain is by far the leading producer of fluorspar among G7 countries, but its annual output is dwarfed by a half dozen other countries, mostly located in Eurasia but also including México. Berbes Mining Area, Asturias, Spain. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

Gregory Wischer (2024) also noted the significant declines evident in the U.S. National Defense Stockpile (NDS), and that a year earlier the Department of Defense had projected a shortfall. In a linked report to Congress, the NDS was reported to have only USD 912.3 MM in stockpiled materials as of April 2023. This alarming shortfall in materials critical to both military and civilian output shows a deficit of USD 13.5 BN, between the NDS stockpile two years ago and nondefense demand only in the case of a global conflict involving the USA (Keys, 2023). NDS inventories of strategic and critical minerals are stockpiled in Arizona, Indiana, Nevada, New York, and West Virginia.

Given the hype surrounding them, many will be surprised to discover that rare earth elements (REEs) are not especially rare, but that they are widely if unevenly distributed across the earth’s crust. But mining and refining them into pure elements or alloys of use to industry in ways that are relatively safe and cost-effective?

That’s another matter altogether. The environmentally “dirty” extraction involved in REE mining and processing make them items no-one with an IQ above room temperature wants being processed in their neighborhood.

While there are sources for various rare earth minerals across the U.S., outside of mining them in the heavy minerals sands in the southeast and in California, commercial exploitation of these seems an unlikely near-term objective. At this time, Mountain Pass Minerals (NASDAQ: MP) a legacy gold and europium mine and recent-vintage processor located in southeastern California, is the sole domestic source of commercial quantities of certain REEs. They are in the process of implementing closed-cycle “cleaner” refining and metallization processes that permit the first entirely domestic source of REE alloys and magnets (California Curated, 2025), which is one of the few positive signals on the horizon.

Axinite (Mg) and epidote (manganese). Canta Mining District, Lima Department, Perú. South Africa and Gabon are the world’s two largest manganese producers, with Australia following a rather distant third. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

Net Import Reliance on Critical Minerals by the U.S. and EU

As an example of the importance of these elements to weapons manufacturers, the strategic minerals deemed critical for Military-Industrial or Aerospace & Defense by both the European Commission (2020) and the U.S. Geological Survey (2022) are, in alphabetic order: Aluminum, antimony, beryllium, cobalt, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, indium, lithium, magnesium, niobium, scandium, strontium, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, vanadium and all the REEs.

Cogwheel bournonite (antimony), sphalerite (zinc), and pyrite (iron). Famous for its lithium deposits, Bolivia possesses major reserves of other strategically important minerals. Víboras Mine, Potosí Department, Bolivia. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

In 2023, the U.S. was dependent on imports for 95-100% of the following minerals. Commodities that are now entirely sourced externally are highlighted in bold: Arsenic, fluorite/fluorspar, cerium (REE), cesium, chromium, dysprosium (REE), erbium (REE), europium (REE), gadolinium (REE), gallium, graphite, holmium (REE), indium, lanthanum (REE), lutetium (REE), manganese, neodymium (REE), niobium, praseodymium (REE), samarium (REE), scandium (REE), tantalum*, terbium (REE), thulium (REE), titanium, ytterbium (REE), and yttrium (REE).

0ther key critical elements heavily reliant on imports (USGS, 2025a) include:

Cobalt* – 67% imported

Chromium – 74% imported

Tin* – 74% imported

Barite - >75% imported

Zinc - >75% imported

Antimony – >82% imported

Platinum – 83% imported

*These also appear the Conflict Minerals list.

The EU relied on imports for 95-100% of their supplies of these minerals in 2020: Antimony, bismuth, graphite, lithium, magnesium, niobium, scandium, tantalum, titanium, all other REEs (+16 not listed previously – the EU lumps all of these elements together under a single category).

0ther key critical elements heavily reliant on imports by the EU:

Fluorite – 66% imported

Barite – 70% imported

Cobalt – 86% imported

Bauxite – 87% imported

A 2020 European Commission report notes in its conclusions that, “The EU’s success in transforming and modernizing its economy depends on securing in a sustainable way the primary and secondary raw materials needed to scale up clean and digital technologies in all of the EU’s industrial ecosystems.”

Good luck with that, Ursula.

Chatoyant fibrous malachite (copper) from the now infamous “Cobalt Capital of the World” in southern Congo on the Zambian and Angolan borders. Democratic Republic of the Congo currently produces almost three-quarters of global cobalt output amidst armed conflict raging in its northeast.** Kolwezi Mining District, Lualaba Province, DR Congo. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

From 2019-2022, two countries–the PR China and Canada–were leading import sources for minerals in the U.S. including REEs, with both supplying between 19 and 24 commodities (USGS, 2025a). China’s former lead role in supplying critical minerals to the U.S. not already export-restricted is likely to continue to cease entirely as diplomatic tensions and trade conflicts mount between the two countries.

Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in DRC cobalt has become the poster child of all that is evil about strategic mineral sourcing to western consumers and human rights advocates. Widespread use of forced child labor under abominable working conditions, and involvement in the exploitation od these mines by a myriad of armed factions led to several minerals sourced in the DRC as “Conflict Minerals” (GAO, 2024). Given the bad press surrounding many of them, G7 environmentalists have shown vocal opposition to the contamination associated with mining of many critical minerals.

Allies and friendlies that are known to have decent reserves of some critical elements include Australia, Canada*, Indonesia, DR Congo, and México*. Maintaining good commercial and diplomatic relations with these countries now would seem to be of paramount importance to the U.S.

Dendritic, acicular, and plumose stibnite (antimony). Palomo Hill Mines, Castrovirreyna Province, Perú. Both Perú and Bolivia are potential major Western hemisphere sources for antimony. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

*Are México and Canada still to be considered “friendlies”?

Antimony Sourcing and Stockpiling as a Case Study in Failure of U.S. Strategic Planning

Antimony is a valuable metalloid and strategic commodity for metallurgy that is used downstream in bullet and advanced munitions manufacture, the formulation of certain key alloys, in semiconductor production, in lead-acid and lithium-ion battery manufacture, as a flame retardant, in the manufacture of industrial glass and ceramics, etc. (Parker, 2020; Blackmon, 2021; USGS, 2025b). Recent reports show that almost 80% of all antimony used for industrial purposes in the U.S. ends up in flame retardants and bullets/artillery rounds. At this time the U.S. relies almost entirely on imports of oxides, powder, and metal for its antimony needs, other than about 15% of total usage that is generated by and then consumed recycled material used to make lead-acid batteries (USGS, 2025b).

Stibnite, apart from being a popular collector’s crystal, is the main antimony ore.

Stibnite is a sulfide mineral, in this case a compound of antimony and sulfur–that is to say antimony trisulfide–as is its rather rare dimorph, metastibnite. It is sometimes called antimonite or stibine in older reference works and by a few parochial European and Chinese mineral dealers. Stibnite from some localities may contain trace quantities of other metals including lead, copper, silver, and gold (Parker, 2020).

Just after the start of the Russian Federation’s Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine in early 2022, during the course of researching the history of antimony production in the USA, I came across an article arguing for the need to restart antimony mining in Idaho that was published in Forbes (Blackmon, 2021). While occasionally reading like an investment promo brochure for Perpetua Resources (NASDAQ symbol: PPTA), the article was right on target when it came to its identification of several risk factors to the international antimony supply chain and the need to urgently return to domestic production of antimony. Its recommendations appear to have been acted on in a fairly leisurely manner by interested parties.

The People’s Republic of China has the largest known reserves and is the largest producer and exporter of antimony by a very wide margin. The combined output of three BRICS member countries–China, Tajikistan, and the Russian Federation–represented almost 90% of all antimony produced globally in 2023, and is likely at similar levels today (Jaganmohan, 2024).

After years of provocation by U.S. politicians, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) responded by giving them the middle finger and imposing export limits to the U.S. of antimony in August of 2024, followed by a similar measure to the EU in October last year. In December 2024, the PRC blocked all exports of antimony, gallium, germanium, and superhard processed materials to the U.S. and the EU (Jackson, 2025; S&P Global, 2025). Predictably, both The U.S. and Europe responded by having their media toadies whine that China was “weaponizing” its control over these and other critical minerals.

Near black stibnite (antimony). An unusually-colored stibnite specimen from China’s largest antimony producing region. Chashan Antimony-Tungsten Mine, Guangxi Province, PR China. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

The sole domestic antimony smelter operating at this time, United States Antimony Corporation (NASDAQ: UAMY), produced ~680 MT (1,500,000 lb) of processed antimony over the past year, mostly from imported feedstock (Sekelsky, 2025; USGS, 2025b). It is unclear what impact recent blanket tariffs on imports will have on antimony prices in the U.S., given its reliance on imported raw material, but it seems likely that they will increase accordingly.

United States Antimony Corp. has an installed capacity to produce almost 2,300 MT (5,000,000 lb.) of antimony annually at its smelting facility in western Montana (USAC, 2025). A wholly-owned subsidiary has recently announced its intentions to restart its processing operations in Coahuila, México using antimony ore imported from Australian mining operations. This smelter has a capacity of ~2,400 MT, so the combined potential output from both North American facilities working at full capacity in a best case scenario is ~4,700 MT (10,300,000 lb.) against 2024 U.S. apparent consumption of 24,000 MT (52,900,000 lbs; USGS, 2025b).

The positive grid plates of older lead-acid batteries manufactured in G7 countries formerly contained between 5-11% antimony. Contemporary automotive backup power, and industrial energy system batteries have reduced antimony volumes to 1-3% (Nishad & Bhaskarapillai, 2021). Most of this antimony is recycled and reused by the lead-acid battery manufacturers (USGS, 2025b) so is more or less moving within a closed loop on the margins of the broader market.

Global antimony production has declined by more than half since peak output in 2011. This trend is definitely a cause for concern for end users and is likely a major factor fueling the current price increase (Jaganmohan, 2024). “Friendly” countries that are alternate sources for commercial quantities of antimony ore and oxide include Tajikistan (currently the world’ second largest producer but located in a sketchy neighborhood), Myanmar (ditto), and Australia (USGS, 2025b).

While there are substitutes for antimony in industrial production for some products, most of them are critical minerals themselves (USGS, 2025).

Own Goals

The market reaction in G7 countries to the Chinese export ban in late 2024 was immediate and predictable. Spot market 99.65% purity antimony ingot prices ramped from ~USD 11,000.00 per metric ton/MT (=2,204 lb) ex-warehouse in Rotterdam, Holland during January 2024 to over USD 50,000.00 per metric ton by late March 2025, for a near five-fold increase in response to the ban on Chinese exports to the U.S. and the suspension of exports to the EU later last year (S&P Global, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Prices for domestically-processed antimony sold in the U.S. as of mid-March 2025 reportedly exceeded USD 55,000.00 per MT (Sekelsky, 2025).

Reflecting the recent sharp price rise in antimony (as well as gold in Perpetua’s case), the stock prices of both United States Antimony Corp. and Perpetua Resources on NASDAQ saw increases of from 2.75X to 9.5X over the past 12 months.

Antimony stocks in the unclassified National Defense Stockpile report as of September 30, 2022, were a scant 90.3 MT (199,000 lb.). Ceiling purchases programmed for fiscal year 2025 were only 700 MT (1,543,000 lb. - Keys, 2023; US Defense Logistics Agency, 2024).

Feel free to draw your own conclusions about the risk to key weapons and high-tech production capacity evident here. Unless we have Double Secret stockpiles hiding somewhere near Roswell, New Mexico things look iffy for stable antimony supplies in the near- to midterm.

Bladed stibnite (antimony). Baia Sprie Mine, Maramureș, Romania. Eastern European antimony mines were once important sources of this critical mineral for regional smelters but are now largely depleted. There are plans to restart antimony extraction from two long-shuttered mines in Slovakia, which may or may not translate into reality (Mining.com, 2024). Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

For the military industrial complex antimony is an important constituent of armor-piercing ammunition, high-explosive shells, flame-retardants, night vision headsets, and advanced electronics. Limited, low-intensity expeditionary wars that grind on for years or decades but burn ammo and machinery at relatively low levels that can more or less be matched by G7 military industrial manufacturing capabilities. Peer continental warfare is another matter altogether, as the ongoing Ukraine conflict has shown. While Western European militaries may be incapable of lasting more than a few weeks in conflict with superior adversaries, in the past they have shown to be both inclined and well-equipped to–at least for short periods–engage in successful safaris to sub-Saharan African nations in order to establish fiefdoms and loot strategically valuable mineral resources.

There is no stibnite/antimony sulfide being commercially mined in the U.S. at this time. Opposition by local stakeholders who are understandably unwilling to accept the environmental contamination that results from antimony mining makes large-scale exploitation of limited U.S. antimony reserves an iffy proposition. On many levels mining is a dirty business and, ironically, the actual extraction process may be the cleanest part of them all. Wading into the mire that is lobbying the political influencers that govern the permitting and regulatory processes is not for the faint-hearted.

That said, direct investment and grants by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), coupled with environmental impact waivers inherent in the recent Presidential Executive Order could facilitate opening new antimony and REE mines in the U.S. Both Perpetua Resources and Mountain Pass Minerals are already beneficiaries of DoD grants.

I chose antimony as a case study due to my familiarity with it, but one could pick almost any of the less-common commodities on the critical minerals list and a similar story will be told in terms of G7 vulnerabilities to supply chain disruptions caused by trade and shooting wars.

Ice green fluorite (fluorspar) and sphalerite (zinc). México is the second largest global producer of fluorspar, at ~1.0 million MT and a handy and reliable supplier of this critical mineral for its northern neighbor. Naica Mine, Saucillo, Chihuahua, México. México is rich in many Critical Mineral reserves. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

Conclusion

Despite statements to the contrary by uninformed jingoists and the rest of the upbeat propagandists’ chorus, the U.S. and the EU are far from being omnipotent autarkies. Beyond rising input prices in general, they are collectively at serious risk of being cut off from some critical mineral resources at any moment. Time to explore viable alternative sources is a luxury they simply do not possess if they–in my opinion– unwisely choose to escalate existing conflicts, which for now seems the path that they have chosen. Widespread malinvestment over decades has left many of these countries with declining manufacturing bases, infrastructure-deficient, and startlingly complacent about their futures given current geopolitical realities. There seems to be a prevailing opinion in the G7 that the extremely well-armed Eurasian adversaries they have provoked in recent years will be perfectly willing to hold their coats, shine their shoes, and otherwise assist them while the U.S, EU, and UK slowly rebuild their military industrial capacity and rearm via the provision of critical energy and mineral commodities that they supply.

As recent Chinese and Russian energy and critical mineral export controls suggest, U.S. European, and Japanese leaders need to dream faster.

For more information on stibnite specimens and antimony uses, an older, extensively-illustrated article is posted on this website here: https://www.exoticaesoterica.com/magazine/taking-a-stab-at-stibnite

Roselite (arsenate) on an indeterminate matrix. Roselite is associated with cobalt- and quartz-bearing hydrothermal veins. Most collector material originates from the DR Congo and Morocco. Bou Azzer Mine, Ouarzazate Province, Morocco. Author’s collection. Image: ©Jay Vannini 2025.

References

Blackmon, D. 2021. Antimony: The Most Important Mineral You Never heard Of. Forbes. 2 pp. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2021/05/06/antimony-the-most-important-mineral-you-never-heard-of/?sh=64cd8e532b23

The author, who is a Senior Contributor and analyst with Forbes Magazine, almost managed to turn the discussion of a critical topic–the U.S.’s over-reliance on offshore sources for strategic minerals that are also available domestically–into an infomercial for Perpetua Resources (PPTA), a Nasdaq-listed and Idaho-based gold mining company.

California Curated. 2025. The Mountain Pass Mine in California May Be the U.S. Rare Earths Game Changer. https://californiacurated.com/2025/01/29/the-mountain-pass-mine-in-california-may-be-the-u-s-rare-earths-game-changer/

James F. Carlin. 2006. Antimony Recycling in the United States in 2000. Flow Studies for Recycling Metal Commodities in the United States. U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1196-Q. U.S. Department of the Interior. V + 8 pp. https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1196q/c1196q.pdf

European Commission. 2020. Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a path towards greater Security and Sustainability. Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee and The Committee of Regions. Brussels, 02.09.20. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474

Gregory, F. and P. J, Milas. 2024. China in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: A New Dynamic in Critical Mineral Procurement. Strategic Studies institute. U.S. Army War College. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3938204/china-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-a-new-dynamic-in-critical-mineral/

This concise and well-written article touches on the importance of cobalt in global supply chains and the dominance of Chinese investment in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Conveniently overlooking the U.S.’s constant meddling that have resulted in political destabilization of the Congo since its independence from Belgium in 1960, it predictably attacks China’s role in developing critical mineral resources in the DRC and calls for new, less-exploitive foreign investment models there. Clearly, there are no clean hands in cobalt mining in the DRC and this proposal ostensibly has considerable merit. However, the notion that the U.S. would be in any way less aggressive in resource stripping than the PR China seem to be if given a free hand is simply not a credible argument. Despite considerable risks involved, the optimum solution–for both the Congolese and end users–to the current resource stripping in the DRC would be for a well-heeled and adventurous investor to install cobalt ore-to-ingot processing facilities there.

**One week after I posted this article, the Financial Times reported that the U.S. was closing in on a critical minerals deal with the DR Congo in exchange for providing “backing” to President Felix Tshisekedi’s shaky government. It is a no-brainer to predict increased conflict in the DRC as the U.S. and China flex their economic and military muscles there seeking control of its critical mineral treasure trove.

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Jaganmohan, M. 2024. Mine production of antimony worldwide from 2010 to 2023. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1241586/global-antimony-production/

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Mining. com. 2024. Military Metals acquires antimony, tin projects in Slovakia. https://www.mining.com/military-metals-acquires-antimony-tin-projects-in-slovakia/

National Energy Technology Laboratory. 2024. The Carbon Ore, Rare Earth, and Critical Minerals (CORE-CM) Initiative. U.S. Department of Energy. https://netl.doe.gov/resource-sustainability/critical-minerals-and-materials/core-cm

Nishad, P. A. and A. Bhaskarapillai. 2021. Antimony, a pollutant of emerging concern: A review on industrial sources and remediation technologies. Chemosphere. Volume 277. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0045653521007219

Parker, R. 2020. Stibnite – The Metallic Explosion. Mineral of the Quarter. Outcrop. Vol, 69, No. 1. Pp 28-33.

Robertson, A. 2023. Deep Dive: Valley Co. mine proposal said to help clean waste & secure key mineral. Critics see flaws for environment, tourism. Boise dev/Idaho First. February 23, 2023, https://boisedev.com/news/2023/02/23/stibnite-idaho-perpetua/

Local reporting on the pros and cons of a proposal to reopen the Stibnite Mining District in north-central Idaho to provide the U.S. with a domestic, industrial scale antimony source for the first time in almost three decades. Unsurprisingly, strong opinions expressed on both sides of the argument.

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S&P Global. 2025. China responds to U.S. restrictions with export ban on select critical minerals. https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/china-responds-to-us-restrictions-with-export-ban-on-select-critical-minerals

United States Antimony (USAC). 2025. Website accessed several times during late March 2025. https://www.usantimony.com/

U.S. Congress. 1939. Strategic and Critical Minerals Stock Piling Act. 50 U.S.C. § 98. Chapter 190, Enacted June 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 811. Amended 2024. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-674/pdf/COMPS-674.pdf

U.S. Defense Logistics Agency. 2024. Annual Materials Plan for FY 2025. Announcement. https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Strategic%20Materials/Announcements/3256%20FY24%20AMP_ACQ.pdf?ver=OIWiKRKy4OcCHuS0W3kpGw%3d%3d

U.S. Department of Defense. 2025. Department of Defense Awards $ 5.1. Million to Recover Rare Earth Elements from Recycled Electronic Waste. Press Release. 1 pg. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4033048/department-of-defense-awards-51-million-to-recover-rare-earth-elements-from-rec/

U.S. Federal Register. 2022. 2022 Final List of Critical Minerals. USGS.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/02/24/2022-04027/2022-final-list-of-critical-minerals

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). 2025a. Rare Earths. Mineral Commodities Summaries. U.S. Department of the Interior. 2 pp. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024.pdf

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). 2025b. Antimony. Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2025. https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2025/mcs2025-antimony.pdf

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2024a. Critical Materials: Action Needed to Implement Requirements That Reduce Supply Chain Risks. GAO-24-107176. Published September 10, 2024. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-107176

Provides a list of potential acquisitions of critical materials for fiscal year 2025, running from October 1, 2024 through September 2025.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2024b. Conflict Minerals: Peace and Security in Democratic Republic of the Congo Have Not Improved with SEC Disclosure Rule. GAO-25-107018. Link to full report provided: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107018

Utah Geological Survey. 2023. Critical Minerals of Utah. Second Edition. Utah Department of Natural Resources. https://ugspub.nr.utah.gov/publications/circular/c-135.pdf

van den Brink, S. R. Kleijn, B. Sprecher, N. Mancheri, and A. Tukker. 2022. Resilience in the antimony supply chain. Resources, Conservation and Recycling. Volume 186: 1-10. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921344922004219

Wischer, G. 2024. The U.S. Military and NATO Face Serious Risks of Mineral Shortages. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/02/the-us-military-and-nato-face-serious-risks-of-mineral-shortages?lang=en

An interesting and well-researched piece that highlights reductions in USA inventories of minerals critical to the MIC since the 1950s. I strongly recommend that anyone interested in the subject read this article. One observation mars an otherwise excellent text. Incredibly, the author, who is a critical minerals consultant, suggests replacing depleted uranium (DU) for steel alloy in tank rounds as one solution to address potential shortfalls in the latter hardened metal. This despite a considerable body of evidence from Kosovo and Iraq showing long-term contamination from widespread use by U.S. and NATO of DU munitions; 30,000 rounds in the Kosovo Conflict and 650 tons in 1991-2003 Iraq Wars that has led to horrendous cancer and birth defect rates.

One wonders how thrilled he would to be to have DU contamination lurking in his own backyard?

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